Lobster Fishery Licensing: Injustice and Muddling Through by Snow, Rod
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 4 Issue 1 Article 6 
10-1-1977 
Lobster Fishery Licensing: Injustice and Muddling Through 
Rod Snow 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Natural Resources Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Rod Snow, “Lobster Fishery Licensing: Injustice and Muddling Through?” (1977-1978) 4:1 DLJ 119. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 




Lobster means different things to different people: for some it is the
ultimate in gourmet dining; for the lobster fisherman it is the object
of his labour and investment and the key to his lifestyle.
There are over 20,000 lobster fishermen in Atlantic Canada who
land approximately 36 million pounds of lobster at an annual landed
value of about $40 million.' Lobster is Atlantic Canada's single
most valuable fishery, more valuable than cod or herring. 2
Management of the lobster fishery is entrusted to the Fisheries
and Marine Service of Environment Canada. A central aspect of
their management programme has been an extensive licensing
system.
This article is intended to provide an overview of that system
with the avowed object of encouraging a reconsideration of the
present legislation. It is also written in the hope that some of the
legal loopholes found presently in the legislation will encourage test
litigation by lawyers acting for lobster fishermen should these
loopholes remain open.
Structurally, the article is divided into five sections. Firstly, the
article will detail briefly the state of the lobster industry in Atlantic
Canada. Secondly, an outline will be presented of the regulatory
framework governing the lobster industry. Thirdly, consideration
will be addressed to the statutory framework of the licensing
system. Fourthly, the objectives of the licensing system will be
analysed in detail with particular emphasis being given to present
regulatory efforts to eliminate part-time fishermen or "moonligh-
ters" from the industry. Finally, the powers granted by statute and
*Rod Snow, LL.B. Dalhousie, 1976; Graduate Student, University of Washington,
Seattle
This article is a revised version of a paper prepared for credit in Professor D. M.
Johnston's course in Coastal Law at the Dalhousie Law School in the Spring Term
of 1976. The statutory law is stated as of July 31, 1976.
1. Lobster Fishery Task Force, Final Report, March 1975, Table 1, at 124
2. Environment Canada, Fisheries and Marine Service, Summary of Canadian
Fisheries Statistics, 1973 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975) Table 4
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regulations and particularly, the procedures that have to be followed
in the exercise of those powers, will be considered.
As a final introductory note, it should also be stated that if this
article has a particular perspective in analysing the present licensing
system, it is that of the lobster fisherman in dealing with the federal
regulatory authorities. However, no apology need be made for that
fact; for it is the thrust of the article that the present regulatory
regime is inequitable towards the lobster fisherman in a number of
respects. Not only is there a lack of clearly articulated legislative
standards for administrative intervention and a lack of well-defined
procedures governing such intervention; but at times there is a high
degree of arbitrariness employed by authorities which stems from
the failure of the regulatory regime to resolve vital policy issues
relating to the economics of the industry.
II. The Fishery as an Industry
The object of the fishery is the American Lobster, biologically
known as Homarus americanus, which belongs to a group known as
crustaceans - so-called because of their hard but jointed "crust",
or shell. Close relatives are the European Lobster (Homarus
gamarus) and the Norway Lobster (Nephrops norvegicus). 3
The lobster has two main body regions: the combined head and
thorax, known as the "body" and the abdomen, known as the
"tail". The combined head and thorax is covered by a one piece
shell known as the "carapace". 4
The lobster's habitat is a rocky ocean floor rather than a sandy or
muddy bottom. 5 Generally, they are more prevalent in shoal waters
than in deeper areas and fishermen find that catches are best on
sea-bed ridges and humps. Lobsters, at the adult stage, appear to be
nonmigratory. Tagging experiments have shown that lobsters travel
an average of only two or three miles in a period of one year. 6
Fishermen claim that a difference of a few hundred yards in trap
location may make a difference in catch because the trap is outside
the area of a particularly abundant lobster population.
3. Id.
4. D. W. McLeese and D. G. Wilder, Lobster Storage and Shipment (1964),
Bulletin Fisheries Research Board Can., No. 147 at 3
5. Id. at 6
6. D. G. Wilder, Movements, Growth and Survival of Marked and Tagged
Lobsters Liberated in Egmont Bay, Prince Edward Island (1963), 20 J. Fisheries
Research Board Can. 305
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Lobsters are known to be subject to two diseases, both of which
may be fatal but neither of which is harmful to humans. But by far
the greatest cause of mortality of lobsters of legal size is fishing. 7
Lobsters are caught by means of wooden, half-cylinder shaped
traps of two and a half to four feet in length which are set on the
ocean floor and attached by a rope to a buoy at the surface. Lobsters
are attracted to the trap by bait-herring, gaspereau, mackerel or cod
- placed on a "spindle" in the trap. The lobster has access to the
trap through either of two funnel-shaped mesh nets on the side of the
trap. Because the lobster travels "tail-first" it can force its way into
the trap and then once inside the trap, it can enter the "parlour"
compartment by forcing open yet another mesh funnel. But once in
the "parlour", escape is prevented by a flap which closes over the
small end of the funnel and entraps the lobster in the "parlour".
At the primary level, the lobster industry is composed largely of
two-man operations. Generally, one man owns the lobster fishing
vessel - usually of Cape Island style - and the gear. He is the
captain of the boat and employs a hired man or helper, sometimes
for a wage but more often for a share. Partnerships do exist but they
are exceptions to the rule. In some areas of Atlantic Canada,
companies own the boats and hire captains to run their lobster fleets
- this is particularly the case in parts of Northern New Brunswick.
The Atlantic lobster fishery is predominantly an inshore fishery
with traps being set anywhere from a few hundred yards to
twenty-five to thirty miles from shore. In 1971, a small offshore
lobster fishery was introduced to provide employment for fishermen
who were displaced due to the closing of the swordfishing industry
on account of mercury poisoning. At present, six or seven boats
harvest about one million pounds of lobster each year from the
Georges Browns and Baccaro Banks area south of Nova Scotia on a
year-round basis.a
Because the fishery is predominantly an inshore fishery, lobster
fishermen tend to leave the wharf in the morning and return home at
night with their catches. The lobsters are sold live; either as
"market" when they are shipped to live lobster markets in the
eastern United States and central Canada, or as "canners" when
they are canned for shipment to more distant markets. In recent
7. A. Gordon Dewolf, The Lobster Fishery of the Maritime Provinces: Economic
Effects of Regulations (1974), Bulletin Fisheries Research Board Can., No. 187 at
10-11
8. Supra, note I at 98
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years, more lobsters have been chanelled into frozen foods markets.
"Market" lobsters traditionally have attracted a better price, but the
ability of the fisherman to sell his catch as "markets" has been
somewhat dependent upon the fisherman's proximity to consuming
areas. Consequently, fishermen in southwestern Nova Scotia have
been able to sell lobsters as "markets" much more successfully
than those in Newfoundland.
Another salient characteristic of the east coast lobster fishery is its
extreme diversity. For example, the average landed value per
fisherman in 1973 in the area from Burn's Point to Baccaro in
Southwestern Nova Scotia was $5,370; while, in the same year, the
average landed value per fisherman in all the Quebec and
Newfoundland districts was $477.9 To some extent, management
programmes have been sensitive to these differences.
III. The Regulatory Framework
The statutory authority to manage the lobster fishery is found in the
Fisheries Act. 10 Section 34 of the Act empowers the Governor-in-
Council to make regulations for, inter alia, "the proper
management and control of the seacoast and inland fisheries". The
Lobster Fishery Regulations'- issued under the authority of section
34 provide the framework for management of the lobster fishery.
In order to understand the lobster fishery licensing system, it is
necessary to appreciate the management framework in which lobster
licensing is conducted.
Regulation of the lobster fishery and licensing of lobstering are
not recent developments. The initial attempts at regulation were
made as early as 1873 with conservation as a goal;' 2 and licences
were first required in 1918 following the recommendation of the
Dominion Shell-Fish Fishery Commission. '3
Today's lobster regulations and licensing system are the
successors of these first government interventions in the field.
Schedule I of the Regulations provides for twenty different
inshore lobster fishing districts and an offshore district.' 4 It also
provides the dates of the closed season in each district and the
9. Id., Table 2 at 126
10. R.S.C. 1970, c.F-14
11. S.O.R./74-77
12. Supra, note 7 at 17
13. Id. at22
14. S.O.R./74-77, Schedule I
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minimum carapace length of lobsters. Lobsters with a smaller
carapace length are to be returned to the water immediately. I5 It is
an offence under the Regulations for anyone to land "berried"
(egg-bearing) lobsters.' 6 For a person engaged in the lobster
fishery, possession of lobster claws or tails detached from the main
body region constitutes an offence. 17 Schedule II sets trap limits for
each district and Regulation 12(1) (b) requires that all traps fished in
the Maritime Provinces have tags affixed to the sill. The fisherman
can thus use a limited number of traps to catch lobsters of a certain
size during a specified part of the year in one particular district. It is
against this background of regulation, introduced largely for
conservation purposes,' 8 that the lobster fishery licensing system
operates.
IV. The Licensing System -Statutory Framework
Section 91(12) of the British North America Act 19 confers exclusive
legislative authority on the Parliament of Canada to legislate in
relation to "Sea-Coast and Inland Fisheries". A series of cases20 at
the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century made it clear
that the federal legislature has the power under Section 91(12) to
require fishing licences.
It is useful to examine the position at common law with respect to
participation in ocean fisheries, owing to the fact that a regime of
lobster fishery licences acts as a statutory restriction upon the right
of a specific sector of the public to participate in the fishery
industry. It is in this regard that the early constitutional cases are
pertinent.
In Attorney-general (British Columbia) v. Attorney-general
(Canada)21, Viscount Haldane examined aspects of the common
law relating to fisheries. He said:
15. Id., reg. 3(2)
16. Id., reg. 3(3) (a)
17. Id.,reg. 13
18. The exception is the regulation on trap limitation which was introduced to
restore the net economic yield.
19. 30&31 Vict., c.3 (U.K.)
20. Attorney-General (Canada) v. Attorney-General (Ontario), [1898] A.C. 700;
67 L.J.P.C. 90 (P.C.); Attorney-General (British Columbia) v. Attorney-General
(Canada), [1914] A.C. 153; 15 D.L.R. 308 (P.C.); Attorney-General (Canada) v.
Attorney-General (British Columbia), [1930] A.C. 111; [1930] 1 D.L.R. 194
(P.C.)
21. [19141A.C. 153; 15D.L.R. 308
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• ..[T]he subjects of the Crown are entitled as of right not only
to navigate but to fish in the high seas and tidal waters alike. The
legal character of this right is not easy to define. It is probably a
right enjoyed so far as the high seas are concerned by common
practise from time immemorial, and it was probably in very early
times extended by the subject without challenge to the foreshore
and tidal waters which were continuous with the ocean, if indeed,
it did not in fact first take rise in them. 22
In concluding he stated further: "So far as the waters are tidal the
right offishing in them is apublic right subject only to regulation by
the Dominion Parliament [emphasis added]." 
23
It is in the regulation of this public right of fishing that lobster
fishery licences are granted. Regulations 9, 10, 11 and 16 of the
Lobster Fishery Regulations 2 4 provide the statutory framework for
the licences.
There are two types of "licences" 2 5 which a fisherman must
obtain: (1) a lobster fishing vessel operator's licence, and (2) a
lobster fishing vessel certificate of registration. Regulation 9 deals
with the former and Regulation 10 deals with the latter. Both
regulations are framed negatively, i.e. they prohibit fishing without
a licence but they do not authorize the issuance of a licence.
Authority to issue licences is found in Section 7 of the Fisheries
Act:
The Minister may, in his absolute discretion, wherever the
exclusive right of fishing does not already exist by law, issue or
authorize to be issued, leases and licences for fisheries or fishing,
wherever situated or carried on; but except as hereinafter
provided, leases or licences for any time exceeding nine years
shall be issued only under authority of the Governor General in
Council.26
Clearly, this authorizes the issue of the operator's licence but a
question can be raised as to whether this provides legislative
authority for the certificate of registration. A lobster fishing
22. Id. at 169; 15 D.L.R. at 315
23. Id. at 173; 15 D.L.R. at 318
24. S.O.R./74-77
25. At first glance, one might think a third type of licence has been added by the
Atlantic Fishing Registration and Licensing Regulations, S.O.R./76-21 1.
Regulation 10(1) requires "an entry permit" for limited fisheries. However, the
Fisheries and Marine Service reports that at present it considers the lobster fishing
vessel certificate of registration issued under the Lobster Fishery Regulations as
sufficient to satisfy this requirement.
26. R.S.C. 1970, c.F-14, s.7
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certificate of registration is certainly not a lease and the question
then arises as to whether it is a licence in terms of the law.
According to Black J. in Russel v. Ministry of Commerce for
Northern Ireland:
The word licence has a well recognized signification in English
law. According to our law a licence properly so-called is merely a
permission granted to a person to do some act which but for such
permission it would be unlawful for him to do . .. . When one
finds the word 'licence' used in a statute the presumption is that it
is intended to designate a purely personal privilege, a privilege
not capable of being assigned or transferred by the licensee to
anyone else and which comes to an end on the death of the
licensee. 27
To decide whether a lobster fishing vessel certificate of registration
is a licence, it is necessary to know precisely what rights and
obligations are associated with such certification.
All lobster fishing boats fall into one of two categories - A or B
- depending on the number of traps that were fished from that boat
prior to January 20, 1969. This number varies from fifty to a
hundred traps depending on the district. 28 Vessels with less than
that number are in Category B and, when ownership changes, 2 9 or
when the vessel is retired from the lobster fishery, 30 the certificate
ends. Other vessels are Category A vessels and their certificate can
be transferred when ownership of the vessel changes.
31
Certificates of registration, insofar as they are transferable, will
conceivably not fall within Black J.'s definition of a licence.
Arguably, such certificates are not personal privileges to use a
certain vessel in the lobster fishery; but rather they authorize the use
of a particular vessel in the fishery, whosoever the owner is.
Consequently, it appears that Section 7 of the Fisheries Act may
not authorize the Minister to issue lobster fishing vessel certificates
of registration. Moreover, a survey of other provisions in the
Fisheries Act reveals no section any more likely to provide the
required statutory authority than Section 7.
Authority for the issuance of vessel certificates might be found in
27. [1945]N.I. 184at 188and 193
28. S.O.R./74-77, reg. 2
29. Id., reg. 10(8)
30. Id.,reg. 10(10)
31. A temporary freeze on licence transfers existed from December 30, 1975 to
mid-March, 1976. Transfers are now permitted from one bonafide fisherman to
another.
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Regulation 10(11) of the Lobster Fishery Regulations which
provides as follows:
The Minister may issue a lobster fishing vessel certificate of
registration to any lobster fishing vessel where in his opinion
special circumstances warrant the issuance of a lobster fishing
vessel certificate of registration to that person.
However, it would be straining the language of the subsection to
assert that special circumstances existed in each of the thousands of
cases where vessel certificates have been issued. Presumably, this
provision was intended to give the Minister discretion to grant a
certificate to a new vessel which was not replacing a Category A
vessel being removed from the fishery, but which the Minister
thought should be participating in the fishery.
If, as suggested, there is no statutory authority permitting the
Minister to issue certificates, then it is submitted that any
regulations requiring certificates are presently unenforceable.
Further investigation reveals another apparent inconsistency
between the Fisheries Act and the Lobster Fishery Regulations. This
centres on the question of who, at law, is the "Minister". Section 2
of the Fisheries Act, as amended, defines "Minister" as the
Minister of the Environment. His duties and powers under the
Fisheries Act have now been transferred to the Honourable Romeo
LeBlanc, a Minister of State. 32 He has authority under the Act to
issue a licence. Regulation 2(1) defines "Minister" as "The
Minister of Fisheries for Canada". Strictly speaking, there is no
Minister with precisely this designation. Consequently, it is open to
argument that Regulations 9 and 10, requiring an operator's licence
and vessel certificate issued "by the Minister" have no legal effect.
However, a court reviewing the matter might take a different view
completely, and give meaning to the phrase 'The Minister of
Fisheries' for Canada, on the basis that it would frustrate the
intention of the legislature to treat this language as ineffective.
The lobster fishing vessel operator's licence is issued by the
Minister to a fisherman personally and is valid only in the district
for which it is issued. 33 This prevents fishermen from fishing in
more than one district in one year, because only one licence can be
issued to a person in one year. 34 Indeed, if a fisherman wishes to be
32. S.I./74-104
33. S.O.R./74-77, reg. 9(5)
34. Id., reg. 9(6)
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licensed to fish in a district outside the one where he resides, there
are special procedures that have to be followed. 35
Both the vessel certificate and the operator's licence are issued
annually and are available from fishery officers, acting as the alter
ego of the Minister, at local offices in the district where the
fisherman resides.
Regardless of any decision which a court might render if faced
with either or both of these technical legal arguments, one thing is
clear: there is a need to improve the drafting of the Act and the
Regulations. Mistakes in the Regulations are inexcusable. With
respect to the Act, it can only be said that it is an outdated piece of
legislation, badly in need of a careful overhaul so as to provide the
Fisheries and Marine Service with a modem and effective statutory
framework under which it can conduct the important function of
managing Canada's fisheries.
In view of Canada's declared intention to exercise management
jurisdiction over a two hundred mile fishing zone as of January 1,
1977, the time would seem ripe to undertake such a complete
review and updating of the Fisheries Act and of (subordinate)
regulations made in terms of the Act. If the Lobster Fishery
Regulations are any indication of the benefits associated with such
an undertaking, the exercise could yield returns well worth the
effort.
V. The Licensing System - Objectives and Recent Developments
In recent years the focus of government involvement in the lobster
fishery has changed from one of conservation to one of
management. The licensing system in the fishery provides the key
to the implementation of this change.
Throughout the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, the total
landed value of lobsters did increase in the Atlantic area.
Nevertheless, the general trend, with only minor exceptions, 36 was
toward a decline in the return on investment as fishermen were
faced with ever-increasing costs.
Sensing this trend, the Fisheries and Marine Service has
increasingly perceived its role as being one of managing the fishery
to improve the economic yield of participating fishermen rather than
35. Id., reg. 9(7)
36. The harvest has remained relatively stable and even improved in parts of
District Number 4.
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achieving conservation per se. The licensing system was therefore
introduced to further this objective of increased returns.
The first aim of the licensing system was to provide an accurate
inventory of all the fishermen and vessels participating in the
fishery.37 From this list, it was possible to determine the amount of
effort involved in the fishery. After this information was available,
it was thought possible to take steps to maximize the returns to the
fisherman.
The rationale for the licensing system is rooted in economic
theory. Economists reason that there is a level of harvest below the
biologist's maximum sustainable yield, that level of effort at which
the fishery may be harvested without depleting the stock over time,
and which will provide the best return on investment for the
fisherman. 38 This level constitutes the net economic yield, also
referred to as optimum utilization, 39 or that level of effort "which
maximizes the net economic yield; the difference between total
cost, on the one hand, and total receipts (or total value product), on
the other."
40
The point of maximum sustainable yield is shown in Figure 1.
Landings are shown on the vertical axis and effort per year on the




6 a b c Effort/Year
Figure 1. Landings Function of a Lobster Fishery. The following inferences appear
from the diagram.
37. Press release, Department of Fisheries, Information Branch, February 6, 1968.
Copies of this and other releases are available from Information Branch, Fisheries
and Marine Service.
38. Supra, note 7 at 32 -34
39. This was the terminology used in Article 51 of Part II of the International
Single Negotiating Text produced after the Geneva session of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
40. H.S. Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The
Fishery (1954), 62 J. Political Economy 124 at 129
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If demand is perfectly elastic (i.e., the amount of lobsters landed
does not affect price and a price for the lobsters landed is introduced
then the landings curve can be translated into a revenue curve. With
the introduction of a cost function into the graph, it is possible to
plot the point of optimum utilization. This is done in Figure 2. The
point of optimum utilization of the lobster resource is at Od, where
the difference between revenue and costs is the greatest. As can be
seen from Figure 2, the level of effort which produces optimum
utilization of the lobster resource is somewhat less than the level of
effort which will provide the maximum sustainable yield.
Total Revenue
0 a d b c EffortYear
Figure 2. Total Cost and Revenue Functions of a LobsterFishery
The object of the licensing programme in the lobster fishery has
been to reduce the amount of effort, from a level which had in the
past been yielding a harvest beyond that which was sustainable, to a
level close to the optimum utilization of the lobster stocks.
Since effort is comprised of a labour and capital investment, the
approach taken was to limit both forms of investment. Conse-
quently, in 1968 lobstering became a restricted or limited entry
fishery. Through the licensing system, an inventory of effort was
established and maintained. By retiring Category "B" vessels from
the fishery, an attempt was made to reduce directly the amount of
capital and to reduce the amount of labour indirectly. Paradoxically,
it seems that the licensing system had exactly the opposite effect, at
least to a limited degree, instead of reducing capitalization, it
encouraged it. Some lobster fishermen who would have retired their
vessels from the fishery when they had an opportunity to leave the
fishery, made an effort to keep vessels licensed to participate in the
fishery as security against economic misfortune that might impede
their alternative employment. 41
41. Statement by Dick Stewart, Executive Director, Atlantic Fishermen's
Association, to the Coastal Law class at Dalhousie Law School, March 3, 1976.
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Another consequence of the limited entry licensing programme in
which vessel ownership was the key to entry, was that the licence
giving permission to fish lobsters, acquired a property value of its
own. A lobster boat sold with a licence attracted a far greater price
than one sold without a licence: the difference represented the value
of the licence. Licences have been sold "at $1,500 to $2,000
depending on the appetite of the buyer".42
As might be expected, this licensing system has been the subject
of some debate. With lobster licences selling at such an inflated
value on the open market, yet another obstacle to those wanting to
enter lobstering was added. For those fishermen with a licence, the
lobster licence has served as a retirement bonus when they leave the
fishery. Some of the lobster fishermen approve of the present
system and disapprove of a system where the licence would be
granted to the licensee only and would revert to the government
when the fisherman retired. A spokesman for the Atlantic
Fishermen's Association argued:
The drawbacks of having the licence on the man. . . are that if a
man works all his life to build up a sixty or seventy thousand
dollar lobster rig, he should be able to leave this business to his
son or his wife should have the opportunity, in case of his death,
to sell the business in its entirety. If this were not the case, the
value of the boat and/or business would probably drop by
two-thirds in value. 43
In its preliminary report, the Lobster Fishery Task Force took the
opposite view:
Although selling lobster fishing privileges is economically sound
and does provide retiring fishermen with a higher payment for
their boat and gear than they would normally receive, the practice
is not popular with fishermen. The Task Force is of the opinion
that the lobster fishing privilege should be removed from the boat
and attached to the fisherman, recognizing that it is persons not
objects which fish. Such a move should also remove distortion
from the boat market.
4 4
The debate continues unabated.
42. Romeo LeBlanc M.P. (as he then was), Can. H. of C. Standing Committee on
Fisheries and Forestry, Proceedings, No. 4 (March 28, 1974) at 9
43. Dick Stewart, Executive Director, Atlantic Fishermen's Association,
correspondence dated October 30, 1975
44. Lobster Fishery Task Force, Preliminary Report, February 1975 at 61. The
extract quoted provides an interesting insight into the policy-making process in the
lobster fishery. When the Task Force presented its final report the excerpt had been
replaced by the following, at p. 71 of the Final Report, supra, note 1:
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Recently, steps have been taken to move the level of effort in the
lobster fishery still closer to optimum utilization. The focus of
attack upon the licensing programme has been the over-
capitalization in the fishery and the method of attack has assumed
the form of the controversial "moonlighters" policy. 45 The attacks
raised the ire of politicians, was front-page news4 6 and was
criticized severely by editorial writers. 4
7
The "moonlighters" policy has consisted of legislation by press
release. Newspaper reports which referred to "regulations" 48 were
inaccurate. There were no new regulations or amendments
merely ministerial policy statements.
In announcing the policy on December 30, 1975, the Honourable
Romeo LeBlanc, Minister of State for Fisheries, said the policy
"will give us a smaller fleet catching more lobsters per fisherman".
He explained:
We have no intent to disturb the part-time fisherman with a real
dependence on the lobster fishery or a man using his boat in more
than one fishery. We want only to honour the demands of these
legitimate fishermen by excluding a minority with no real stake in
the lobster industry. 4
9
Coupled with this was a temporary freeze on vessel certificate
transfers.
Against this background, registered letters were sent in January,
1976 to approximately fifteen hundred persons who held vessel
certificates in 1975. They were informed that "persons with
full-time jobs would not be able to participate in the lobster
fishery". The letter continued, "Information on hand suggests that
Although selling lobster fishing privileges does provide retiring fishermen with
a higher payment for their boat and gear than they would normally receive, the
practice is not popular with fishermen. It did, however, receive support, with a
few exceptions, at the meeting with fishermen, packers, and provincial
government officials, held in Halifax in March, 1975.
From the language used, one suspects that the Task Force was forced to change its
position, albeit only slightly, by the industry spokesmen. One wonders how
grudgingly the changes were made.
45. Press release entitled Tighter Controls on East Coast Lobster Fishery,
December 30, 1975 and a subsequent press release February 10, 1976, Fisheries
and Marine Service, Environment Canada
46. Halifax Chronicle-Herald, January 27, 1976; Lunenburg Progress Enterprise,
January 28, 1976; The Pictou Advocate, January 28, 1976
47. Halifax Chronicle-Herald, February 2, 1976
48. E.g., Lobster fishery plan "'flexible" -LeBlanc, Halifax Chronicle-Herald,
January 28, 1976
49. Supra, note 45
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under the above criteria your lobster fishing licence [sic] will not be
renewed in 1976". It concluded by indicating that an appeal could
be launched by completing and returning an enclosed Statutory
Declaration. A subsequent letter was sent to clarify the confusion
created by the first letter. The decision as to who should receive
these letters was made on the basis of a survey conducted by local
fishery officers. 50 Among those who received letters were doctors,
lawyers and chartered accountants. 5 1 Others were less clearly
moonlighters: these included inter alia Laurence Chandler of
Chester, Nova Scotia, who has fished lobsters for close to forty
years and at the time worked seventeen hours a week as a janitor in
the Chester Federal Building, 52 and an anonymous fisherman on
Nova Scotia's South Shore who has fished lobsters for thirty-four
years, supplementing his income during the closed season as a
self-employed painting contractor. 53
The ostensible object of the "moonlighters" policy, that of
increasing net economic yield by reducing effort to the level of
optimum utilization, commends itself. However, the number of
fishermen required to harvest the resource at this level has never
been adequately stated. Indeed, optimum utilization is nowhere
described clearly as an objective. 54 In effect, it appears from these
facts that the fishermen are being used as "guinea pigs" on which
to test the economic theories on optiminium utilization. Indeed, it is
remarkable that there is no specified goal in terms of the number of
people who will be permitted ultimately to fish lobsters.
There is also a question of considerable moral significance
involved. Specifically, in a world hungry for protein, should we in
Canada who own some of the world's most valuable fisheries,
decide against using those available fisheries so as to obtain the
maximum amount of protein. In fact, it is with Canada's insistence,
that the nations of the world, through the vehicle of the Law of the
Sea Conference, have begun to progress in this direction. 
55
50. Statement by Bernie Vaughn, District Protection Officer, Fisheries and Marine
Service, reported in The Pictou Advocate, January 28, 1976 at 1
51. Halifax Chronicle-Herald, February 3, 1976
52. Lunenburg Progress Enterprise, January 28, 1976 at 1
53. Information contained in a letter from a South Shore barrister handling the.
fisherman's appeal.
54. Although the December 30 statement did say that measures will reduce the
number of lobster licences "until there is a better balance between resource and
effort". Supra, note 45 at 2
55. Supra, note 39
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Finally, there is the question of whether the new licensing
controls should be accompanied by a buy-back programme. Several
arguments support such a repurchase facility. Those persons with
investment in a lobster boat and gear who have lost their vessel
certificate under the new measures, would find there is no ready
market for their boat and gear. No new fishermen would want to
buy such equipment because the new owner would not be able to
use the boat and gear for lobstering. If the lobster fisherman should
sell his rig "piece-meal" to non-fishermen or other fishermen then
he will receive far less than he would otherwise have received had
he sold his rig as a going concern. In an accounting sense, the
announcement of the "moonlighter" policy reduces substantially
the owners's equity in the business venture. The crucial policy
question is whether there should be some measures to compensate
the "moonlighter" for his loss in equity.
In British Columbia, when limited entry was very successfully
introduced into the Pacific salmon fishery, it was accompanied by a
buy-back programme. The government purchased the vessel of
fishermen leaving the fishery instead of letting them sell to other
persons who would keep the vessels active in the fishery.
Consequently, the selling fishermen realized the equity in their
investment when they left the fishery. The vessels were
independently appraised on the basis of estimated market value by
two appraisers. Their appraisals were averaged and a 5% bonus
added as an inducement to sell to the government. The vessels
purchased in this fashion were then sold at public auction yielding
46% of their value as fishing vessels. 56 It is to be noted that this
programme was applied to vessels retired voluntarily.
In the lobster fishery, retirement under the "moonlighter" policy
will be compulsory and without compensation. This can be
contrasted with government expropriation where compensation is
paid to an owner deprived of his property. 57 The British Columbia
system is more closely comparable to an ordinary offer of purchase
where the vendor either accepts or rejects the purchaser's offer but
has no legal right to fair market value. Indeed, if the British
Columbia experience proves true in Atlantic Canada, the effect
would be the same as if the government had expropriated one-half
of a lobster fisherman's rig without any compensation.
56. B.A. Campbell, Licence Limitation Regulations: Canada's Experience
(1973), 30 J. Fisheries Research Board Can. 2070 at 2074
57. E.g. Expropriation Act, 1973, S.N.S. 1973, c.7, s.24
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The Lobster Fishery Task Force rejected the idea of a buy-back
programme, citing the following reasons: (1) without extremely
large expenditures only marginal fishermen would be eliminated
thereby resulting in no substantial reduction in effort; (2) there is no
basis on which to value the fishing privilege being purchased; (3)
questions would arise as to whether public funds should be used to
purchase a privilege in order to protect persons from competition;
(4) no settlement would ever be accepted or understood. 58
A proper resolution of this aspect of the licensing problem may
depend on whether participation in the fishery is seen as a right or a
privilege. Yet, whatever the decision reached, political factors will
have a considerable impact upon the results.
Further critical questions arise as regards the functioning of the
appeals procedures available to fishermen who had lost their lobster
licences.
The fifteen hundred fishermen who received the January letters
indicating that their vessel certificate would not be received in 1976
were given the right to appeal to local licence Appeal Committees
constituted for this purpose. Although the Committees have now
finished the bulk of their work, they have not been disbanded.
Each committee is composed of five persons - a representative
of the Fisheries and Marine Service, two lobster fishermen, an
industry representative, and an independent member. The chairman
and government representative on each Committee is the District
Protection Officer (DPO). At his request, the fishermen representa-
tives were selected by a fishermen's organization in each district.
The independent member was nominated by the DPO. The District
Protection Officer had jurisdiction over all appeals in his Protection
District while the other Committee members only heard those
appeals coming from their own lobster district or county.
The role played by the DPO in choosing the Committee members
and as chairman ruling on procedure, coupled with his larger
geographical jurisdiction, would logically tend to make him the
most influential Committee member. However, he is only one
member of a committee of five which is otherwise heavily weighted
with fishermen. In the past, there have often been disagreements
between Atlantic fishermen and government. Fishermen have
served as strong critics and have often resisted government policy
initiatives. One suspects that, if the DPO began to wield too much
58. Supra, note 1 at 77
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influence, the fishermen on the Committee would resist.
The most serious problem with the Appeal Committees is the one
with the most potential for abuse. Without commenting on the
honesty and integrity of the lobster fishermen on the Committees, it
must be noted that they, as bona fide fishermen, stand to gain with
the elimination of "moonlighters" from the fishery. That
elimination goal is the declared purpose of the policy. Such
pecuniary interest on the part of fishermen as Appeal Committees in
the outcome of a case is one which has disqualified decision-makers
many times on the ground of bias.
At a time when the Fisheries and Marine Service has begun to
win back a respectable reputation in the industry, such threats to the
integrity of the legal procedures used are most damaging. The
structure and operation of the Appeal Committees should rather
have been developed differently so that the "moonlighter" could
not accuse the government and the prosperous fishermen of a
conspiracy to help the "rich get richer" at the expense of the
'moonlighter".
Nevertheless, there were reasons for the structures adopted. It
was contended that the smaller jurisdictions in which fishermen and
the independent member served on Appeal Committees enables
these people to bring local knowledge and expertise to bear on the
appeal. The District Protection Officer was purposefully given a
larger jurisdiction so that he might be able to bring uniformity to the
proceedings - at least within his district. However, this
rationalization still fails to override the objection to interested
fishermen actually "deciding" appeals.
Regarding the procedures employed on appeal, the Appeal
Committees heard the appeals of the individuals affected and made
recommendations to the Regional Headquarters of the Fisheries and
Marine Service. The Regional Headquarters reserved the right to
review the cases before a final decision was made.
The fishermen were given a right to appeal this decision to the
Minister. Because of the large number of appeals, implementation
of this policy was postponed until 1977 in those areas where a
spring and summer fishery occurs. 59 Since the vast majority of
persons whose licences were challenged fished during a spring or
summer season, this action has had the effect of introducing a year's
59. Press release, Implementation of Lobster Policy Delayed, April 27, 1976,
Fisheries and Marine Service, Environment Canada
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postponement. At the date of writing many lobster fishermen
apparently stand in limbo awaiting the outcome of their appeal.
Those whose appeals have failed, have now begun to contemplate
ways to make up for this loss in income.
Since the statutory authority to issue licences is vested in the
Minister, the decisions of the Appeal Committees are, of legal
n-ecessity, only recommendations. Any alternative arrangement
would introduce the undesirable effects connoted by the Latin
maxim delegatus non potest delegare, i.e. a delegate may not
re-delegate. 6
0
In regard to the actual Appeal procedures used, the Appeal
Committee conducted two-stage enquiries in each case. 61 The first
question each considered was one of fact; namely, whether the
appellant was:
(a) a person who was fully employed outside of primary industry
employment; or
(b) a person who had full time seasonal employment.
6 2
If the fisherman was such a person, then unless there were
extenuating circumstances of an economic nature, as, for example,
where the person and his family would face extreme economic
hardships unless he could continue lobster fishing, his vessel
certificate was not recommended for renewal. The Appeal
Committee decided the employment question and recommended on
extenuating circumstances.
The key terms in the employment question are defined as follows:
"fully employed" means employed or self-employed on an
annually recurring basis for a full twelve months including any
leave, vacation or time off for which the employee received
remuneration.
"full time seasonal employment" means employed or self-
employed on an annually recurring basis a minimum of
thirty-five hours per week in employment that is totally
concurrent with the open lobster fishing season for the district in
which the employee resides.
60. For a discussion of the problem see John Willis, Delegatus Non Potest
Delegare (1943), 21 Can. B. Rev. 257
61. The information about the structure, composition and functioning of the
Appeal Committees was obtained from Harry W. Scarth, Fisheries and Marine
Service, Halifax, Nova Scotia during a personal interview on March 5, 1976.
62. Proposed criteria for functioning of the Appeal Committees. These criteria are
in the process of being presented as amendments to the Lobster Fishery
Regulations.
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"primary industry employment" means self-employment in
logging, farming or fishing. 
6 3
This information was not made public prior to the commence-
ment of the first Appeal Committee hearings. Nevertheless, these
were the criteria on which an appellant's case was to be judged.
This silence created an appalling situation of judgement according
to "criteria unknown" and should have been treated as impermissi-
ble in law.
The only substantial reason for failure to make this information
available generally was the fear that it would restrict unduly the
ability of the Appeal Committees and the Minister to be flexible in
individual cases. As a further procedural justification, it was stated
that the provisions had not yet been fully approved. In view of this
procedural argument the appeals should instead not have been
permitted to proceed. In order that justice be both done, and be seen
to be done, it is paramount that all measures, whether they be in the
form of statute, regulations, or ministerial policy, be made known
to the individual concerned prior to the time when he might be
adversely affected by them. He should not be denied the opportunity
of knowing beforehand what "law" governing his behaviour
actually prevailed.
Owing to the manner in which the Appeal Committees operated,
it is unlikely that any of the traditional administrative law remedies
could be involved to remedy this abuse of jurisdiction. For, the
Appeal Committees only make recommendations to the Minister
and have no power to decide any question affecting the appellant.
Their function is purely administrative. 6 Accordingly, the
traditional prerogative writs and remedies under the Federal Court
Act 65 will not extend to their decisions.
In concluding this part of the article it is important to make a
comparison between the Alaska Fisheries controls and the controls
discussed above. In 1972, after obtaining the necessary constitu-
tional amendment, Alaska enacted a limited entry law affecting
fisheries. 66 The legislation dealt with all of Alaska's fisheries. It
established the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
with three members, who were to have no direct or indirect
63. Id.
64. Guay v. Lafleur, [1965) S.C.R. 12; 47 D.L.R. (2d) 226
65. R.S.C. 1970 (2ndSupp.), c.10
66. Alaska's Limited Entry Law, Alaska Seas and Coasts, June 15, 1973. The
comparative analysis contained in this paper is based on this article.
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relationship with the fishing industry. Among other things, the
Commission was charged with the task of establishing the optimum
number of entry permits and the qualifications for entry permits for
each fishery, as well as administering a buy-back scheme. The
procedures established were as follows: after the optimum number
of entry permits were established, fishermen were ranked into
priority classifications based on (1) their "degree of economic
dependence on the fishery" and (2) their "past participation in the
fishery". 67 If the number of issued permits was greater than the
amount considered optimum, then the Commission reduced the
number of permits through a buy-back system, purchasing permits,
vessels, and gear from a fund created through an assessment of the
fishermen in the fishery.
The noteworthy features of the Alaskan system were the
independence of the authority administering the programme and the
functional certainty of the programme. Under the Alaskan system,
the law was defined clearly and not left to the discretion of a
politically sensitive authority. Indeed, this would seem to be a clear
instance in which Canada could learn much from the American
legislative experience.
VI. Licence Suspensions
Faced with the responsibility of managing a scarce, but valuable,
common property resource, the Fisheries and Marine Service has
responded in a variety of ways to the needs of the industry. A host
of regulations were formulated to regulate short and berried lobster
fishing, closed seasons and trap limits. Violations of these
regulations have lead to fines averaging $145.68 However, by far
the most important and effective 69 Ministerial sanction has been the
threat of suspension of licence and vessel certification.
The licence and vessel certificate suspension - and the word
"suspension" should be used with caution - poses various
problems for the fisherman and a lawyer attempting to advise him.
The following discussion will analyze some of these problems
which have periodically been drawn to the attention of the public. 
70
67. Id. at 7
68. Supra, note 1 at 89
69. Information provided by the Fisheries and Marine Service, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, shows that the number of suspensions has dropped from 208 in 1970, the
last year before the present suspension policy, to 130 in 1974.
70. E.g., Ombudsman, CBC-TV, November 9, 1975; Yarmouth Vanguard,
October 29, 1975
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Despite the fact that during the period from 1971 to 1975
inclusive, 251 lobster licences were suspended, 71 none of the
suspensions has ever been challenged in court. As a result, there is
no precedent to serve as a guide.
Section 34 of the Fisheries Act, 72 under which the Lobster
Fishery Regulations 73 are issued, empowers the Governor-in-
Council to make regulations...
(f) respecting the issue, suspension and cancellation of licences
and leases;
(g) prescribing the terms and conditions under which a licence or
lease is to be issued.
This power was exercised in the making of the following
Regulation:
16. The Minister may cancel or suspend the licence of any
person, or the lobster fishing vessel certificate of registration
of a lobster fishing vessel owned or operated by that person,
or both, if that person is convicted of a violation of these
Regulations. 
74
On the first reading, it appears that the Minister has found the
statutory authority for suspending a licence and vessel certificate.
Indeed he has. However, this apparent clarity dissolves into a
muddle of ambiguity when the actual suspension is more closely
scrutinized particularly in the context of the entire fisheries
management legislative framework.
An appreciation of the legal ambiguity requires an understanding
of the mechanics of the licence suspension procedure and its effect
on the fisherman involved. The scenario that follows is the story of
Jerry Cottreau of Wedgeport, Nova Scotia, 75 and is typical of the
problems encountered in the suspension process.
On April 12, 1975, Jerry Cottreau was returning to the wharf with
his day's catch of lobsters. When he reached the wharf, his boat was
met by a fishery officer who found a number of undersized lobsters
segregated from the day's catch. Cottreau admitted that he had
intended to take these lobsters home to eat but denied any
involvement in commercial poaching.
71. Supra, note 69
72. R.S.C. 1970, c.F-14
73. S.O.R./74-77
74. Id., reg. 16
75. The facts of the Cottreau case are drawn from a story in the Yarmouth
Vanguard, October 28, 1975 and a personal conversation with him.
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Cottreau was charged with a violation of the Lobster Fishery
Regulations and convicted before a magistrate. Prior to the trial,
however, it was brought to his attention that, if convicted, his
licence might be suspended and he was asked to sign a form
acknowledging that he had been so notified.
Months later, on July 28, 1975, Cottreau received a registered
letter from J. E. Creeper, Assistant Director General, Fisheries
Management, Maritime Region, which read in part as follows:
This letter will serve as notice that your Personal Lobster Fishing
Licence and the Registration of your Lobster Fishing Vessel will
not be renewed for the first fourteen (14) days of the 1975 season,
beginning on the official opening day of the fishing season in
Lobster Fishing District No. 4.76
This is a standard sentence in suspension letters.
Prior to this letter, Cottreau was not notified that the Minister was
considering his case, nor was he familiar with the policy being
applied in his case since it was made public only in press releases on
February 24 and November 12, 1971.77
During this period when he was totally ignorant of the process of
law, his case was nevertheless being decided. In nearby Yarmouth,
a fishery officer reviewed his case and recommended that the
Minister's policy be followed. This recommendation was made
after surveying a remarkable piece of internal "legislation" which
determined that Cottreau's case fell under Schedule A. This
legislation consists of a Tentative Policy on Suspension of Lobster
Fishing Licences 78 which the Fisheries and Marine Service will not
even disclose on request.
Following this internal recommendation the "findings" then
travelled to Ottawa where the Minister made the final decision.
Thereafter, the decision was sent back to Halifax where Mr.
Creeper prepared and sent the controversial suspension letter
described above.
The licence suspension was a severe blow for Jerry Cottreau. He
was a young man with a family to support and had a substantial
investment in his boat and gear. Like many small businessmen he
had relied considerably on debt financing. This was his first
violation.
76. Registered letter, July 28, 1975
77. Press releases, Lobster Violators Face Stiff Penalties, February 24, 1971;
Policy on Suspension of Lobster Fishing Licences, November 12, 1971
78. Obtained from a reluctant fishery officer, November 10, 1975
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Based on the preceding three years' average, Cottreau would earn
$4,000 - $5,000 less in 1975-76 than he would have if he had fished
during the first two weeks of the same season. A further $10,000
loss was caused by the suspension, consisting of money which he
had to pay to his helpers to retain their seasonal services rather than
lose them to other fishermen. The total loss in a typical suspension
case will amount to 25%-50% of the fisherman's gross receipts from
lobstering.
This outline of the administrative procedure used to suspend a
licence and vessel certificate raises questions in regard to the
applicability of the audi alteram partem principle, namely, the right
of the fisherman to a hearing. However, answers are particularly
complex and it is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to
resolve finally the conflicting lines of authority that exist in this
regard. Rather I will simply raise the arguments both for and against
the application of the principle. This will be followed by a tentative
prediction of the likely resolution of this issue.
The best known statement of the audi alteram partem principle
was supplied by Lord Loreburn L.C., early in the century:
Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not
originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers
of the State the duty of deciding on determining questions of
various kinds. . .. In such cases. . . they must act in good faith
and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon
everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are
bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. . .. They
can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving
a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for
correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to
their views. 7
9
In the normal case of a lobster licence and vessel suspension, it is
clear from the example of Cottreau that the Minister, in making his
decision to suspend, does not listen fairly to the arguments of the
fisherman as to why the licence should not be suspended. Failure to
listen, does not determine the question finally. It merely leads to the
next question, which is: does the principle apply to the Minister's
action in this context? This question can only be resolved by
considering the Federal Court Act. 80 Section 28 gives power to the
79. Board of Education v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179 at 182; 80 L.J.K.B. 796 at 798
(H.L.(E.))
•0. R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c.10
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Federal Court of Appeal to "review and set aside a decision or
order, other than a decision or order of an administrative nature not
required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis".
Grounds for review include the failure to observe a principle of
natural justice which embraces the audi alteram partem principle.
Section 2 of the Act, by definition, extends this power of review to
ministerial decisions.
This means that the Minister, even though he may be acting in an
administrative capacity in suspending a licence, may nevertheless
be required to adhere to the rules of natural justice when suspending
the licence if the decision is one which must be made on a
quasi-judicial or judicial basis.
Because the Federal Court Act is a relatively new piece of
legislation, there is little case law explaining what kind of an
administrative decision must be made in a judicial or quasi-judicial
manner.
The opportunity to deal with the question arose in Howarth v.
National Parole Board, a parole revocation case. In the Federal
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J. said:
A decision-making basis is not required to be quasi-judicial in my
view unless it, of neccesity, involves, first, communicating to the
person affected, in some manner, the facts upon which action
against him is contemplated, and, second, giving him a fair
opportunity to answer those facts. 81
This reasoning begs the fundamental question: in what situations
must a person be given the right to state his version of the facts?
When the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, 82
Pigeon J., delivering the majority judgment, based his decision on
an 'earlier case dealing with the nature of parole revocation. He
declined, however, to enter into any discussion of a general nature
of the different kinds of decisions to which section 28 might be
applied.
In dissent, Dickson J. was willing to evaluate the different forms
of decision-making embodied within the Federal Court Act. He
decided that parole revocation was a judicial act because the order
of the Board: (1) had a conclusive effect, 83 (2) was adjudicative, in
the sense that there could be a conflict between the parolee and the
Board as to whether conditions of parole have been violated and, if
81. [1973]F.C. 1018 at 1024; 41 D.L.R. (3d) 309 at 314 (C.A.)
82. Howarth v. National Parole Board, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 453; 50 D.L.R. (3d) 349
83. Id. at 465; 50 D.L.R. (3d) at 361
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so, as to whether the violation deserved revocation,84 (3) had a
serious adverse effect upon the parolee's rights. In meeting
arguments that parole was merely a privilege, Dickson J. said:
Parole is a right. . .; when granted the paroled inmate is entitled
to expect that if he observes the terms and conditions of his parole
and is otherwise of good behaviour, he will remain at large. 85
This dissent is the only clear pronouncement by any members of the
Supreme Court in regard to the effect of section 28.
If all that was involved in dealing with a lobster licence and
vessel certificate suspension case was to apply Dickson J.'s test to
the facts of a case, the lawyer's job of predicting the law for his
fisherman client would have been simple. At present, administrative
discretion has prevented any such certainty.
A careful reading of the standard letter to a lobster fisherman who
is about to lose his licence, reveals merely that his operator's licence
and vessel certificate of registration "will not be renewed". 86 As
noted earlier,8 7 the Minister has power to issue fishing licences "in
his absolute discretion". Because the licence and certificate are
issued annually, non-renewal for the first two weeks of the season
serves as a suspension of two weeks. The same end is reached if the
Minister exercises his discretion and decides not to issue the licence
and vessel certificate of the fisherman only after two weeks of the
season have expired.
Consequently, the matter resolves itself into two issues: (1)
whether the procedure whereby a lobster fisherman is actually
deprived of his licence and vessel certificate is properly construed as
a suspension or as a mere failure to confer a benefit on the fisherman
and (2) whether either, or both, of the alternative constructions
above, is required by law to be performed in a judicial or
quasi-judicial manner. These are questions which yield no easy
answer.
It is to be noted that the licence and vessel certificate are issued
for a period of one year and not renewed automatically. However,
in the industry, the renewal is taken for granted. The fisherman has
made a substantial investment in his boat and gear and is operating
on the assumption that he will be able to fish for a number of years
so that his capital investment may be amortized over that period.
84. Id.
85. Id. at468; 50 D.L.R. (3d) at363
86. Supra, note 76
87. R.S.C. 1970, c.F-14, s.7
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Indeed, he is encouraged to make that investment by the Minister's
Cabinet colleague, the Minister of Finance, who will guarantee
loans under the Fisheries Improvement Loans Act. 88 In short, the
common expectation is that once issued, the licence and vessel
certificate will be renewed annually thereafter.
In substance, then, the Minister's denial of a licence renewal
amounts to an effective suspension of the operator's licence and
vessel certificate. The Lobster Fishery Regulations empower the
Minister to do so. 89 In effect, the result is more than a mere failure
to issue a new licence and vessel certificate. It is a denial of the right
to fish.
Even in regard to form, the Minister's power is confusing and
ambiguous. The language of the Fisheries Act refers to "issue". 90
The Regulations use the word "suspend", 91 while the letter
depriving the fisherman of the opportunity to fish states that the
licence and vessel certificate "will not be renewed". 
92
In Blais v. Basford,93 where the jurisdiction of the Federal Court
of Appeal to hear a matter was at issue, a similar set of
circumstances was considered. Under the Bankruptcy Act, one
section gave the Minister power to renew a licence and another
section granted him power to suspend or cancel the licence. Instead
of cancelling the licence, the Minister renewed it with a limitation,
which, with the passage of time, would prevent effectively the
licensee from continuing to engage in licensed activities. The three
man Court agreed that it was entitled to exercise its jurisdiction
under section 28. In the course of his judgment, Noel A.C.J. made
it clear that he disapproved of the Minister's decision to renew the
licence with a limitation "instead of suspending or cancelling it as
he ought to have done. .. ".
Blais v. Basford is authority for the proposition that, regardless of
the form used to effect the "suspension", the Minister's decision
will still be reviewable on a section 28 application. The decision
also suggests strongly that where the court has the option of
choosing between "suspending" or "failing to reissue", the court
will hopefully opt for the former.
88. R.S.C. 1970, c.F-22
89. S.O.R.174-77, reg.16
90. R.S.C. 1970, c.F-14, s.7
91. S.O.R./74-77, reg.16
92. Supra, note 76
93. [1972]F.C. 151 (C.A.)
94. Id. at 154
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A determination that the suspension has been made under
Regulation 16, is easier for the fisherman to attack and harder for
the Minister to defend than a finding that there has been a mere
failure to issue under section 7 of the Act.
Under Regulation 16, the Minister must ascertain whether a
person has been convicted of a violation of the Regulations before
he can exercise his discretion to suspend the licence. That is a
question which requires an objective determination of certain facts
before the discretion can be exercised.
The suspension of an operator's licence and vessel certificate can
have serious economic consequences. If a lobster fisherman cannot
fish for two weeks of the season he may be deprived of
$5,000-$10,000 in revenue. 95
There is authority holding that the duty to act judicially arises by
virtue of the impact of an act or decision on individual interests.
96
This line of authority has been used to prevent interference with
property interests 97 and statutory offices 98 where the right to be
heard was denied. It was also surfaced in licence cancellation and
suspension cases. 99 The interest affected adversely in these cases is
the economic interest of the licensee in maintaining his licence. This
was illustrated in Klymchuk v. Cowan where the activities of the
Registrar of Motor Vehicles were held to be quasi-judicial. Smith J.
said:
In the case of a driver, cancellation deprives him of his right to
drive a motor vehicle, which may or may not seriously affect his
economic position. In the case of a dealer in used cars,
cancellation effectively prevents him from carrying on his
business and serious economic consequences usually may be
presumed to ensue. '00
Because of the fact that the Minister must make a determination
of fact and base his decision on the evidence of the case, and
because of the impact on the individual affected, there are strong
arguments for holding that the Minister must make his decision in a
judicial or quasi-judicial manner.
95. Supra, note 1 at 89
96. S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (3rd ed. London:
Stevens & Sons, 1973) at 156
97. Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863), 14 C.B.N.S. 180; 143 E.R.
414; 32 L.J.C.P. 185 (Exch. Ch.)
98. Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 (H.L.(E.))
99. Re Watt and Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1957), 13 D.L.R. (2d) 124; 24
W.W.R. 371 (Man. Q.B.)
100. (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 587 at 598; 47 W.W.R. 467 at 478-79 (Man. Q.B.)
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In addition, a licence and vessel certificate suspension meets the
three elements of the Dickson test. 101 The decision is (1)
conclusive; (2) adjudicative in the sense that it pits the Minister
against the fisherman on the question of what the facts are and
whether they warrant a suspension; (3) the decision is adverse to the
fisherman's rights. The Minister has maintained in response that it
is not a right but a privilege to participate in the lobster fishery. '
02
However, at common law, fishing was a right vested in all the
subjects of the realm, 10 3 and it can be argued that this is a right
which it would take the clearest statutory language to abrogate. In
addition, it could be said that a licence is a right like parole which
the licensee is entitled to expect will continue if he observes its
terms and conditions.
If the Court construes the Minister's decision not to renew the
licence and vessel certificate as the exercise of discretion not to
issue under section 7 of the Act, the case for the Minister is
formidable. At common law, a hearing is generally not required in
cases where a licence is granted or a licence is reinstated as opposed
to a revocation or of a licence suspension. ' 0 4 This is because the
process of the grantor, as outlined in the statute, is dissimilar to that
of a court.
It is also to the Minister's advantage that he is a Minister of the
Crown; for courts seem reluctant to require a Minister (whose
normal functions are administrative in nature and policy-oriented) to
give a hearing. This proposition was borne out in Calgary Power
Ltd. v. Copithorne10 5 which is frequently cited' 06 in discussions of
the right to be heard. Martland J. said:
In determining whether or not a body or an individual is
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial duties, it is necessary to
examine the defined scope of its functions and then to determine
whether or not there is imposed a duty to act judicially. '0 7
Further authority has also held against the Minister's denial of a
right of hearing. In Lazarov v. Secretary of Canada ,1 °8 an alien, on
a section 28 application was held entitled to a hearing because the
101. Supra, notes 83, 84 and 85
102. Ombudsman, CBC-TV, November 9, 1975
103. [19141 A.C. 153 at 173; 15 D.L.R. 308 at 318
104. D.J. Mullan, Administrative Law, (Toronto: Carswell, 1973) § 22
105. [1959]S.C.R. 24; 16D.L.R. (2d)241
106. E.g., [19763 1 S.C.R. 453 at 474; 50 D.L.R. (3d) 349 at 353
107. (1959] S.C.R. 24 at30; 16D.L.R. (2d) 241 at247
108. [1973] F.C. 927; 39 D.L.R. (3d) 738 (C.A.)
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Minister had refused a citizenship application on the basis of
information which the applicant had not been given an opportunity
to controvert. It is true that this case could be distinguished on its
special facts. Yet, the Minister would still have to meet the policy
argument which lies at the heart of the fisherman's case and is stated
as follows by de Smith:
There are many situations where, in the course of arriving at a
discretionary decision, it may be desirable or expedient to afford
interested persons notice and an opportunity to be heard but
where the type of function involved is not one that manifestly
calls for any procedure akin to adjudication . . . . The
discretionary allocation of scarce resources (e.g. licenses,
permits, etc.) among competing claimants is perhaps the best
example of this kind of situation. '0 9
It seems, therefore, that the Minister's decision to deprive a
fisherman of his operator's licence and vessel certificate is
reviewable by the Federal Court of Appeal on the ground that it is a
decision which must be made on a quasi-judicial basis. If
reviewable, such a decision would most surely be set aside because
it amounts to a denial of natural justice.
Another possible ground for setting aside the Minister's decision
would be refusal by the Minister to exercise his jurisdiction. It is
rather through press releases, 110 which have found their way into
the Tentative Policy on Suspension of Lobster Fishing Licences,,."'
that the Minister has made public his intended manner of exercising
his discretion under Regulation 16.
There is a possibility that, in issuing such a policy statement and
in following it, the Minister is failing to address himself to the
question which he is authorized to decide; namely, should this
particular licence and vessel certificate be suspended? If he asks
himself whether the offence in question calls for suspension under
the Ministerial Lobster Fishing Suspension Policy, 112 then he may
well be acting without jurisdiction in suspending a fishing licence.
At issue is the right of a deciding authority to prejudge a case by
stating a policy which it thereafter follows. 113 The oft-quoted words
109. Supra, note 96 at 158-59
110. Supra, note 77
111. Supra, note 78
112. The term is one used by Mr. Creeper in a letter to John Biron, dated July 28,
1975. Mr. Biron's vessel certificate was suspended because at the time ownership
was transferred to him, it was subject to the conditions of the policy.
113. See, generally, H. Molot, The Self Created Rule of Policy and Other Ways of
Exercising Administrative Discretion (1972), 18 McGill L.J. 310
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of Bankes L.J. outline the principles involved:
There are on the one hand cases where a tribunal in the honest
exercise of its discretion has adopted a policy, and, without
refusing to hear an applicant, intimates to him what its policy is,
and that after hearing him it will in accordance -with its policy
decide against him, unless there is something exceptional in his
case. I think counsel for the applicants would admit that, if the
policy has been adopted for reasons which the tribunal may
legitimately entertain, no objection could be taken to such a
course. On the other hand there are cases where a tribunal has
passed a rule, or come to a determination, not to hear any
application of a particular character by whomsoever made. There
is a wide distinction to be drawn between these two classes. 114
Because the Minister does not give the fisherman an opportunity
to explain why the suspension policy should not apply to him, the
suspension may be made without jurisdiction. This principle has
been applied in Canada n1 5 and in cases involving Ministers of the
Crown. 116
The application of this principle is especially important in cases
where licences and vessel certificates are suspended in the lobster
fishery because many of the offences under the Regulations do not
require the proof of mens rea;117 although some do require
proof.' 18 As the law now stands, it would be possible for a
fisherman to lose his licence and vessel certificate for a violation of
the Regulations to which he was not party. It is possible that a
fishing offence could be committed when the fisherman was not
even present on the vessel. Although such a case might well not
merit suspension of the licence and vessel certificate, the fact that
the Minister need not afford the fisherman an opportunity to be
heard, renders the suspension, in the words of a senior official of the
Fisheries and Marine Service, to be "automatic or almost
automatic" 119
In the end the fishermen's many arguments may fail to persuade a
court that the court can and should set aside the Minister's decision.
114. R. v. Port of London Authority, exparte Kynoch Ltd., [1919] 1 K.B. 176 at
184; 88 L.J.K.B. 553 at 559
115. Lloyd v. Superintendent of Motor Vehicles (1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 181;
[1971] 3 W.W.R. 619 (B.C.C.A.)
116. British Oxygen v. Minister of Technology, [1971] A.C. 610; [1970] 3 All
E.R. 165 (H.L.(E.))
117. R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 5; 12 D.L.R. (3d) 591
118. R. v. D'Entremont (1973), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 395 (N.S. Mag. Ct.)
119. Statement by Reg Collie, Fisheries and Marine Service, Halifax, Nova Scotia
in a telephone interview on October 30, 1975
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However, that does not-mean that they, the fishermen's contentions,
are without merit.
The Minister has no inherent power to do what he thinks is right
at his mere whim. His powers are created by statute and limited by
the common law. Fundamental to Anglo-Canadian common law are
the right of access to the law and the right to be heard.
The Cottreau case illustrates violation of both these basic
principles. There was no hearing. Consequently, the Minister risked
the possibility that his understanding of the case would be
incomplete and that his decision would inflict unnecessary hardship
on the fisherman. Moreover, when an officer of a local fishermen's
association requested a copy of the policy statement 120 used by the
Fishery and Marine Service his request was refused. Practically
speaking, that policy statement was the "law" and there was no
access to it.
Making a decision in these circumstances seems unjust. It
remains to be seen whether a decision made in these circumstances
is legal.
120. Supra, note 77
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